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Abstract—Malware detection is a growing problem 
particularly on the Android mobile platform due to its increasing 
popularity and accessibility to numerous third party app 
markets. This has also been made worse by the increasingly 
sophisticated detection avoidance techniques employed by 
emerging malware families. This calls for more effective 
techniques for detection and classification of Android malware. 
Hence, in this paper we present an n-opcode analysis based 
approach that utilizes machine learning to classify and categorize 
Android malware. This approach enables automated feature 
discovery that eliminates the need for applying expert or domain 
knowledge to define the needed features. Our experiments on 
2520 samples that were performed using up to 10-gram opcode 
features showed that an f-measure of 98% is achievable using this 
approach.    
Keywords—Android malware; malware classification; malware 
categorization, Dalvik bytecode; n-gram; n-opcode; 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of malware on the mobile platform is an 
increasing problem especially on Android, due to its growing 
popularity and availability of millions of apps from the official 
Google play store, third-party app markets and various online 
sources. The volume of new applications appearing frequently 
is too large for manual examination of each application for 
malicious behavior to be feasible. Hence, this process does not 
scale very easily to large numbers of applications. Previous 
studies have also shown that traditional signature-based 
approaches, which most antivirus scanners employ, fails to be 
effective at detecting new malware due to their increasing 
adoption of sophisticated detection avoidance techniques and 
the need for frequent update of signature databases. 
Android malware detecting is currently an active area of 
research. Consequently, there is a growing volume of work on 
automated detection that utilize machine learning techniques. 
Various methods have been proposed based on examining the 
dynamic application behavior [1, 2, 3], requested permissions 
[4, 5, 6], API calls [6, 7, 8, 22] etc. However these methods are 
often still largely reliant on expert analysis to design or 
determine the discriminative features that are passed to the 
machine learning system used to make the final classification 
decision. 
Some recent studies such as [9, 10, 11] have investigated 
the effectiveness of n-gram opcodes (or n-opcodes as referred 
to in this paper) extracted from the disassembled application 
byte-code as a means for Android malware detection. The 
advantage of the use of an opcode based technique is the ability 
to automatically learn features from raw data directly rather 
than specifying them beforehand through expert analysis.  For 
example, in previous works such as [8] where the 
discriminative features are based on API calls, expert analysis 
provides the selection of the ‘most interesting’ features (i.e. 
API calls methods, signatures, etc.). Unlike the opcode based 
techniques, this could limit the scope of the application of 
machine learning algorithms by excluding potentially useful 
learning information. 
Hence, in this paper we investigate n-opcode analysis for 
Android malware detection using machine learning on real 
datasets. We study this approach and analyze its efficacy for 
both application classification to detect malware and also 
malware categorization (i.e. classification into known families). 
Unlike previous works that experimented with opcodes of up to 
5-grams only, the work presented in this paper analyzed up to 
10-grams sequences whilst also considering both their 
frequencies and binary counts.  The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows: Section II reviews related work; Section 
III presents the n-opcode analysis technique; the evaluation 
experiments and discussions are presented in Section IV while 
Section V concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In this section we review related work on malware 
detection. The two main approaches commonly applied to 
malware detection are static analysis and dynamic analysis. 
Static analysis involves disassembling the program binary in 
order to extract features, while dynamic analysis involves 
running the program in an emulator or instrumented hardware 
in order to extract characteristic actions performed by the 
program. Static analysis has the advantage of being faster and 
may enable greater code coverage than dynamic analysis, while 
dynamic analysis may be less prone to code obfuscation. Some 
previous works such as [14], [15], and [16], have combined the 
two approaches. 
Learning based approaches using hand-designed features 
have been applied extensively to both dynamic [1-3], [18-20] 
and static [6, 7, 8, 22] malware detection. For example, the 
authors of [7] studied a static analysis approach to Android 
malware detection based on 179 features manually derived 
from API calls, intents, permissions and commands that were 
combined with ensemble learning. Their approach was 
evaluated on a dataset of 2925 malware apps and 3938 benign 
apps. A variety of similar approaches to static malware 
detection have used similarly derived features, but with 
different classifiers such as support vector machine (SVM) [12], 
Naïve Bayes [17], and k-nearest neighbor [6]. Malware 
detection approaches have also been proposed that use static 
features derived exclusively from the permissions requested by 
the application [4, 5]. 
In contrast with approaches using high-level hand-designed 
features, such as relevant permissions or API calls, n-grams 
based malware detection uses sequences of low-level opcodes 
as features. The n-grams features can be used to train a 
classifier to distinguish between malware and benign software 
[9], or to classify malware into different families [10]. Perhaps 
surprisingly, even a 1-gram based feature, which is simply a 
histogram of the number of times each opcode is used, can 
distinguish malware from benign software [13]. The length of 
the n-gram used [9] and number of n-gram sequences used in 
classification [13] can both have an effect on the accuracy of 
the classifier. 
In this paper, an n-gram approach is also investigated. 
However, unlike the previous papers we develop an approach 
that enables the use of longer n-grams thus analyzing up to 10-
grams whereas the previously reported works utilized up to 5-
grams [9, 11]. Also, [10] and [13] only considered 1-gram 
opcode features. Furthermore, unlike [9] which was only based 
on binary information, we investigate both frequency and 
binary information thus allowing for greater information 
coverage. Finally, we provide in-depth analysis that provides 
clear insight into why our approach achieve high classification 
accuracy with various machine learning algorithms. 
III. N-OPCODE ANALYSIS 
In this section, we explain how to extract n-opcodes from 
Android applications and how to select n-opcodes that will 
enable optimal malware classification and categorization. The 
following two subsections describe the process of the n-opcode 
extraction and the feature selection and also include statistical 
results from our dataset. 
A. N-opcode Extraction 
The n-opcode extraction of an application consists of 
disassembling the application and extracting n-opcodes. An 
Android application can be delivered as a compressed file, an 
Android application package (apk) file, containing a manifest 
file, resource files and Dalvik executable (dex) files. The dex 
files contain the application source code and can be 
disassembled using baksmali [26]. As a result of 
disassembling, baksmali generates a set of smali files for the 
dex file, where each smali file represents a single class that 
contains all the methods of the class. Each method contains 
human-readable Dalvik bytecode (shortly instructions) and 
each instruction consists of a single opcode and multiple 
operands. We discard the operands and only extract n-opcodes 
from each method. The resulting output of the n-opcode 
extraction is a vector of the unique n-opcodes from all the 
classes of the application. The vector contains the frequency of 
each unique n-opcode. The overview of the n-opcode 
extraction is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. N-opcode extraction 
Any n-gram based method faces the prospect of 
exponential increase in the number of unique n-grams as n is 
increased. It is expected that a similar trend will be observed 
with n-opcodes as well. Fig. 2 and TABLE I.  show the number 
of unique n-opcodes for different n from our dataset, which 
consists of 1260 samples of malware and 1260 benign samples. 
In the malware classification (MC) study, we processed the n-
opcode extraction on all the 2520 samples and counted the 
number of unique n-opcodes for different n, with n ranging 
from 1 to 10. 
 
Fig. 2. Number of unique n-opcodes vs. n 
TABLE I.  NUMBER OF UNIQUE N-OPCODES FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF N 
n MC MT 
1  214   210  
2  22,371   14,550  
3  399,598   154,483  
4  2,201,377   557,526  
5  6,458,246   1,145,025  
6  12,969,857   1,724,771  
7  20,404,473   2,177,621  
8  27,366,890   2,491,721  
9  33,024,116   2,695,226  
n MC MT 
10  37,186,183   2,823,729  
It can be observed that there is no exponential increase in 
the number of unique n-opcodes. Instead, it increases linearly 
at first and gradually becomes stable. One explanation for this 
is that some methods may contain less instructions than n 
therefore those n-opcodes will not appear in such methods. 
Another reason is that a bigger n is likely to generate a smaller 
number of n-opcodes than a smaller n generates from the same 
method. For example, a method with 7 instructions has 6 pieces 
of 2-opcodes, 5 pieces of 3-opcodes. 4 pieces of 4-copdoes and 
so on. Therefore, the maximum number of the unique n-
opcodes for a method is in inverse proportion to n. In the 
malware categorization (MT) study, the number of unique n-
opcodes also becomes stable despite utilizing only malware 
samples for the study. Even though there is no exponential 
increase, nonetheless an excessive number of unique n-opcodes 
that could cause a huge overhead in further processes results. 
The number of the unique 10-opcodes in MC and MT were 
observed to be 37186183 (about 37M) and 2823729 (about 
2.8M), respectively. 
B. Feature Selection 
Since the number of unique n-opcodes is excessive, it is 
difficult to run machine learning algorithms on the original 
data. One of solutions for this issue is feature selection i.e. a 
process of identifying the best features and is a widely used 
approach to filter out less important features. In the feature 
selection stage, we measure the information gain of each 
feature and subsequently filter out the less important features 
that have the lowest information gains. 
Entropy is a measure of the uncertainty of a random 
variable. The entropy of a variable X is defined in (1) below 
and the entropy of X after observing values of a variable Y is 
defined in (2), where P(xi) is the prior probabilities for all 
values of X and P(xi|yi) is the posterior probabilities of X given 
the values of Y. 
 H(X) = –∑P(xi)log2(P(xi))   DE F  
 H(X/Y) = –∑P(yj) ∑P(xi/yj)log2(P(xi/yj))   DE F  
The amount by which the entropy of X decreases reflects 
additional information about X provided by Y and is called 
information gain [21], given by (3). 
 IG(X/Y) = H(X) – H(X/Y)   DE F  
According to this measure, a feature Y is regarded as a 
better indicator than a feature Z for a class X, if IG(X|Y) > 
IG(X|Z). We rank the features by the information gain and 
select the high ranked features. 
In order to compute the IG, we used an implementation of 
the information gain in WEKA [24]. However, the program 
could not handle the large data input from the n-opcode feature 
files and frequently encountered an out of memory error (on a 
Linux PC with 16GB RAM). So in order to overcome this 
problem, we segmented the data into several smaller chunks (in 
multiple .arff files) and computed the IGs on smaller data. This 
worked because the information gain algorithm computes the 
score of a feature independently. Hence, we processed the 
information gain on each small set of features and merge the 
results together at the end as illustrated in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. The overview of our analysis process 
 
Fig. 4. Number of selected n-opcodes 
TABLE II.  NUMBER OF SELECTED N-OPCODES 
n 
MC MT 
Binary Frequency Binary Frequency 
1  29  191  164  199 
2  2,121  4,155  4,567  4,973 
3  12,802  18,411  20,376  21,851 
4  30,293  37,992  43,538  46,253 
5  44,532  51,845  64,450  67,837 
6  51,213  56,850  78,453  81,736 
7  53,079  57,086  86,146  88,839 
8  53,139  55,856  90,024  92,076 
9  52,857  54,837  91,966  93,600 
10  52,588  54,080  92,878  94,239 
 
Fig. 4 and TABLE II.  show the number of selected n-
opcodes with information gain greater than 0.1 for different n. 
As the table illustrates, the number of selected n-opcodes 
increased as n becomes larger. This means that we gain more 
information by increasing n. However, the increase in the 
number of selected n-opcodes reaches a saturation point as n 
increases. Because of this observation, we expect that impact of 
the increase in n on classification accuracy to peak at this 
saturation point where further increase in n will have little 
effect. Another interesting observation is that the number of 
selected n-opcodes for frequency is slightly greater than the 
number of selected n-opcodes for binary. Note that frequency 
and binary refer to the number of counts of the n-opcode. For 
the former it is the overall count, while for the latter it is 1 or 0 
denoting presence and absence respectively. 
IV. EVALUATION 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of n-opcodes 
for malware classification and categorization with different n. 
Evaluation and detail analyses for malware classification and 
categorization are presented in the following subsections, 
respectively. In each subsection, we also compare the 
performance of two different data types: binary and frequency.  
Our dataset consists of malware from the Android Malware 
Genome project [25] and has a total of 2520 applications, of 
which 1260 are benign and 1260 are malware from 49 different 
malware families. Labels are provided for the malware family 
of each sample. The benign samples were collected from the 
Google play store and have been checked using VirusTotal [23] 
to ascertain that they were highly probable to be malware free. 
We use four different machine learning algorithms: Naïve 
Bayes (NB), support vector machine (SVM), partial decision 
tree (PART) and random forest (RF) and utilize WEKA as the 
framework. The following experimental results are reported 
using the weighted average f-measure, which is based on the 
precision and recall, over 10-fold cross validation. 
A. Malware Classification 
In the malware classification study, samples are classified 
into one of two classes: benign or malware. We evaluated the 
performance of malware classification with two different data 
types of n-opcodes: binary and frequency. 
 
Fig. 5. Malware classificatoin results with binary n-opcodes 
Fig. 5 shows the results of the binary n-opcodes. With the 
exception of NB, the performance of the other three algorithms 
were similar although SVM shows the best performance in 
most cases. The f-measure increases as n is increased but no 
more increase is observed when n is greater than 3. The f-
measure even tends to decrease when n is greater than 7. This 
trend is similar with the change in the number of selected n-
opcodes in Fig. 4. NB shows the worst performance but shows 
the same trend. The best f-measure is 98% and SVM performed 
with the best f-measure when n is 3. 
 
Fig. 6. Malware classificatoin results with frequency n-opcodes 
As shown in Fig. 6, the frequency n-opcodes show similar 
results with the binary n-opcodes. One interesting observation 
is that the frequency n-opcodes show a good performance 
when n is 1 (i.e. no n-gram is applied) compared to the binary 
n-opcodes. 
TABLE III.  TOP TNE N-OPCODES FOR MALWARE CLASSIFICATION 
Rank 
Our Findings [9] 
3 4 5 5 
1 08076e 6e0c086e# 6e0c086e0c# 136e6e6e0c 
2 08546e# 08546e0c# 2038071f6e# 1c6e6e0c6e* 
3 0c086e 0c086e0c# 0854380854# 1d546e0a39 
4 220870# 08546e0a# 38071f6e0a# 210135461a 
5 12086e# 08540854# 0854085408# 0c1a6e0a33 
6 390f6e# 38071f6e# 0c08546e0c# 12123c0e22* 
7 085412# 390f6e0a# 0c086e0c6e# 7154626e28 
8 390f54 08543808# 08546e0854# 6e2820381f 
9 085208# 08076e0c 20381f2822 0d076e289c* 
10 085438# 3808546e# 08546e0c08# 16313d740e* 
# : only found in malware samples, * :only found in malware samples,  
bold : mostly found in malware samples, shadow : found in our top ranked n-opcodes 
TABLE III.  shows the top ten binary n-opcodes for 
malware classification. We also present the top ten 5-opcodes 
of [9] (which were the only ones provided) to compare with 
our findings. Even though no same 5-opcodes commonly 
appear between the two top ten 5-opcodes (in the two rightmost 
columns), we found six of the top ten 5-opcodes from [9], 
highlighted in the last column, in our selected 5-opcodes as the 
11770th, 12597th, 13241th, 13260th, 15927th and 25662th ranked 
features, respectively. This could be attributed to the fact that 
our benign samples differed even though we utilized the same 
malware samples as [9]. An interesting observation is that three 
of the overlapping n-opcodes (‘12123c0e22’, ‘0d076e289c’ 
and ‘16313d740e’) are also only found in malware samples just 
as observed in [9]. Another observation is that our top hundred 
5-opcodes are mostly found in benign samples. As we 
highlighted n-opcodes only found in benign samples with ‘#’, it 
can be seen from the table that there were more of the top ten 
n-opcodes only found in benign samples. This would indicate 
that the unique n-opcodes from benign samples were a strong 
contributing factor for malware classification. 
The last observations is that three 4-opcodes (‘08546e0c’, 
‘08546e0a’ and ‘3808546e’) and three 5-opcodes 
(‘0c08546e0c’, ‘08546e0854’ and ‘08546e0c08’) were 
extensions of the second ranked 3-opcode ‘08546e’. We also 
found 51 4-opcodes and 75 5-opcodes from the low ranked n-
opcodes, which were extensions of the same 3-opcode. From 
our evaluation, all these extensions only occurred in benign 
samples. Based on this observation we think it would be 
interesting to investigate training the machine learning 
classifiers with combination of different lengths n-opcode 
features in future. In this work, the machine learning classifiers 
are trained with features of the same length n-opcodes. 
B. Malware Categorization 
In the malware categorization study, samples are classified 
into one of existing malware families. We also evaluated the 
performance of malware categorization with two different data 
types of n-opcodes. Fig. 7 shows the results of binary n-
opcodes which shows a similar trend with the malware 
classification results. SVM shows the best f-measure of 98%, 
with its f-measure becomes steady when n is 4. 
 
Fig. 7. Malware categorization results with binary n-opcodes 
 
Fig. 8. Malware categorization results with frequency n-opcodes 
Fig. 8 shows the results of frequency n-opcodes for 
malware categorization. Again, SVM shows the best f-measure 
of 98%, when n is 6 but SVM and PART show a high f-measure 
of 95%, when n reaches only 2. The frequency 1-opcodes do 
not show a better performance compared to the binary 1-
opcodes, as it does in malware classification. In contrast to 
malware classification, malware categorization is a multi-class 
classification, which is considered as a more difficult problem 
compared to the binary classification. TABLE IV.  shows the 
top ten binary n-opcodes for malware categorization. Since we 
have no data from other research for comparison, we only 
analyze our data for malware categorization. We observed that 
there is no n-opcode that was found only (exclusively) in a 
single family within the top ten n-opcodes. 
TABLE IV.  TOP TEN N-OPCODES FOR MALWARE CATEGORIZATION 
Rank 
n 
3 4 5 
1 36121a 700c390e 22621a701a 
2 3c0e22 621a701a 621a701a71 
3 1a1607 123c0e22 123c0e2270 
4 616174 12123c0e 3c0e22706e 
5 3b7428 313b7428 12123c0e22 
6 313b74 3c0e2270 0c6e0c236e 
7 123c0e 1a706e15 6e0a386e71 
8 3d740e 3922701c 0c22702271 
9 0a8104 3d740e0d 0c1a221a6e 
10 289c08 8104085a 0c1a706e15 
 
In terms of classification accuracy, SVM shows the best 
performance in all the cases. However, the accuracy is not the 
only factor when choosing a machine learning algorithm. 
Another factor is the speed performance and TABLE V. shows 
the time overhead of the machine learning algorithms from the 
malware classification with the binary n-opcodes. RF shows 
the best performance in terms of both training and prediction 
speeds. Even though PART has the highest training overhead it 
is still considered a suitable classifier because once trained, 
classification is fast as well. 
TABLE V.  TIME OVERHEAD OF MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS 
n 
Machine Learning Algorithms 
NB SVM PART RF 
1 0.02/0.01 1/0 0.14/0 0.14/0 
2 0.31/0.22 1.53/0.01 3.26/0 0.27/0 
3 2.18/1.5 5.65/0.03 25.82/0 0.34/0.01 
4 6.41/3.36 12.8/0.1 62.38/0.01 0.51/0.01 
5 11.34/5.02 19.17/0.25 106.13/0.02 0.74/0.02 
6 14.66/5.96 22.32/0.32 191.06/0.02 0.96/0.02 
7 14.23/6.24 24.45/0.38 176.92/0.02 1.15/0.02 
8 13.42/5.97 21.17/0.38 169.25/0.02 1.88/0.02 
9 13.05/5.99 21.29/0.39 157.95/0.01 4.17/0.02 
n 
Machine Learning Algorithms 
NB SVM PART RF 
10 13.36/5.95 27.26/0.36 159.1/0.01 6.07/0.02 
* training / prediction overhead 
V. DISCUSSION 
We evaluated two different types of n-opcode information 
in our evaluation. One is the binary n-opcodes and the other is 
the frequency n-opcodes. The binary n-opcodes only describe 
what n-opcodes have been used in an application while the 
frequency n-opcodes also contains how many times each n-
opcode has been used. From our evaluation, we observed that 
the binary n-opcodes more accurate than the frequency n-
opcodes. Another advantage of the binary n-opcode is that we 
can reduce the storage overhead as mentioned in [9]. 
However, the frequency n-opcodes show very good 
accuracy when n is small. This means that the frequency n-
opcodes with small n can be chosen for light-weight use case 
scenarios. Because the frequency n-opcodes tell us how many 
times each n-opcode has been used so this information can help 
to distinguish applications that use the same n-opcodes but in 
different numbers. The combination of the binary and 
frequency n-opcodes remains as future work. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we investigated and analyzed n-opcode based 
static analysis approach to Android malware detection. This 
approach eliminates the need for hand-crafted or defined which 
require expert knowledge or analysis. Unlike most previous 
works that utilize defined features like API calls, permissions, 
intents and other application properties, our method allows for 
automatic extraction and learning of features from given 
datasets. Furthermore, we achieved analysis with longer n-
grams than the state-of-the art by utilizing up to 10-opcodes in 
our experiments compared to the currently reported maximum 
of 5 in the literature. This was possible using a data 
segmentation technique during pre-processing in order to 
enable feature selection on as large a dataset as possible. Our 
results showed that by using frequency n-opcodes with low n, 
good classification accuracy can be achieved. Nevertheless, a 
maximum f-measure of 98% in both malware classification and 
categorization were obtained with n=3 and n=4, respectively. 
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